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Anonymous Secure Framework in Connected
Smart Home Environments
Pardeep Kumar, Member, IEEE, An Braeken, Andrei Gurtov, Senior Member, IEEE,
Jari Iinatti, Senior Member, IEEE, and Phuong Hoai Ha
Abstract— The smart home is an environment, where
heterogeneous electronic devices and appliances are networked
together to provide smart services in a ubiquitous manner to
the individuals. As the homes become smarter, more complex,
and technology dependent, the need for an adequate security
mechanism with minimum individual’s intervention is growing.
The recent serious security attacks have shown how the Internet-
enabled smart homes can be turned into very dangerous spots
for various ill intentions, and thus lead the privacy concerns
for the individuals. For instance, an eavesdropper is able to
derive the identity of a particular device/appliance via public
channels that can be used to infer in the life pattern of an
individual within the home area network. This paper proposes an
anonymous secure framework (ASF) in connected smart home
environments, using solely lightweight operations. The proposed
framework in this paper provides efficient authentication and key
agreement, and enables devices (identity and data) anonymity
and unlinkability. One-time session key progression regularly
renews the session key for the smart devices and dilutes the risk
of using a compromised session key in the ASF. It is demonstrated
that computation complexity of the proposed framework is low
as compared with the existing schemes, while security has been
significantly improved.
Index Terms— Smart home, Internet of Things, anonymity,
key agreement, unlinkability.
I. INTRODUCTION
SMART home is a technological advancement and conceptfor monitoring and controlling home appliances through
intelligent and coordinated networks and technologies. Smart
spaces consist of a plethora of heterogeneous devices, for
instance, multiple cameras, microphones, sensors, actuators,
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smart appliances, smart curtains and so on. Such a develop-
ment has been leading individuals to the new era of tech-
nology, and the era of the Internet of things (hereafter IoT)
where all the appliances and devices are getting tiny and
controllable via the Internet, thus enabling people to enjoy
network based services, such as home climate control, energy
management, video on demand, music on demand, remote
healthcare, e-commerce, remote control, and other similar
services [1], [2]. Moreover, the number of smart systems will
dramatically increase as the consumer IoT continues to evolve.
As a consequence, the individual will become more and more
dependent on smart systems.
However, the internal network of a smart environment
consists of a number of different communication and net-
work technologies. Examples of some popular standards and
protocols related to home automation include X10, UPB,
INSTEON, Z-Wave, and ZigBee [3]. X10 and UPB utilize
existing electricity, or a power-line network. INSTEON is
a dual-band mesh network topology employing AC-power
lines and a radio-frequency protocol to communicate with
devices. Particularly, Z-Wave [4] and ZigBee [5] are mostly
utilized technologies, having low-power wireless communica-
tion capability. ZigBee supports a specific home automation
profile, and Z-wave is optimized for the reliable low-latency
communication of small data packets with data rates of up
to 100 Kbps [6].
As a technological convergence, many of the home devices
or appliances are always connected to the Internet over wire-
less communications, within the home area network (HAN).
Connecting smart home appliances to wireless networks and
to the Internet, however, makes individuals vulnerable to
malicious attacks. If the smart devices (e.g., smart lights,
appliances, smart watches, smart meters, smart fridge and
many more) within a smart home are inadequately networked,
that will open the occupant of smart home up to much
wider range of security threats including identity theft, device
counterfeiting, etc. In January 2014, it was, for instance,
discovered that more than 750,000 consumer devices including
home routers, televisions, fridges, thermostats, smart locks,
televisions, and so on, had been compromised and/or spied
on the individual [7]. Another research revealed 250 different
security flaws, which equates to 25 vulnerabilities per smart
device [8]. This is due to the weak security design of the pro-
prietary technologies, and lack of capable security standards
of smart objects [9].
Moreover, the fine-grained data of smart devices (e.g., smart
lights, locks, thermostat, climate sensors, appliances, windows,
1556-6013 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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smart television, smart meter information, etc.) are transmitted
via insecure wireless channels in a HAN. Such sensitive infor-
mation may be concealed, controlled and linked without users’
consent. For instance, a non-intrusive load monitoring (NILM)
algorithm could gather home appliances information and iden-
tification (e.g., device identity) from load profiles [10], [11].
In other words, an unauthorized user could take advantage
of NILM algorithm to analyse networked devices within
the home, and hence detect and/or link the individual life
patterns, daily routines, and habits for the sake of profit, theft
and advertisements. This raises, therefore, two main security
concerns: (i) how to network the smart devices/appliances
within a HAN without being identifiable (i.e., anonymity),
and (ii) how to network the smart devices/appliances without
being able to distinguish relationships between two devices
(i.e., unlinkability) in smart home over the public network.
Towards the smart home security, related work mainly
focuses on the device authentication in smart home use-cases
[12]–[18]. However, most of the proposed schemes incurred a
high amount of overhead for authentication [13]–[17]. None of
the schemes are considering anonymity and unlinkability in the
smart homes where the malicious attacker can easily disclose
(and link) the appliances and devices’ identities by utilizing the
NILM algorithm [10], [11], and so breach the home network
security and privacy. It therefore becomes necessary to design
an efficient security framework in connected smart homes
to realize its security protection (considering anonymity and
unlinkability) for the individuals.
In the design of a secure framework for the smart home
environments, providing mutual authentication and key agree-
ment are the required first steps to prevent illegal use of
home appliances and systems. Besides a secure and efficient
authentication, the security framework should satisfy the fol-
lowing merits: (i) Anonymity and unlinkability: Hide of
appliance identity, sensor presence and data-collection activity
from unauthorized tracking. Even a malicious device should
not be able to reveal the identity and relationship of devices
communicating within the home network. (ii) Authentication
and integrity: The source of the information can be corrob-
orated and it is ensured that the protocol information has not
been altered by unauthorized or unknown means. (iii) Low
communication cost and computation complexity: Usually,
a battery-powered smart device generally has severe resource
constraints on its ability to process and communicate data.
As a result, the secure framework must take communication
and computation efficiency into consideration. (iv) Security
safeguard: The secure framework should have ability to resist
possible attacks (e.g., replay attack, impersonation attack) such
that it can be applied in the real home environments.
Considering the above mentioned security merits, we design
and implement an anonymous secure framework (ASF) for
the smart home environments. In the proposed ASF, the smart
devices/appliances can communicate with the home gateway
in a HAN, while providing the above mentioned security
services. The main contributions are in three-fold, as follows.
• First, we present a novel ASF scheme that is very light-
weight and efficient, reducing significantly computation
and communication cost. To the best of our knowledge,
the new ASF scheme is the first scheme that considers
the anonymity and unlinkability in the smart homes.
Inspired by the fact of smart home use-cases, which are
of very sensitive and multidimensional nature, the ASF
scheme utilizes hashing and symmetric cryptosystems to
achieve device anonymity, efficient authentication and key
agreement between two communicating devices within
the home area network. Compared with the existing
schemes, it leads to significantly reduced computation and
communication cost.
• Second, we conduct simulation for formal security analy-
sis of the security strength and anonymity of the new
ASF scheme. In particular, we use AVISPA (automated
verification of Internet security protocol and application)
tool that has been widely used by the standardisation
bodies (e.g., Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)),
and by the academic research to verify security of the
protocols (e.g., [18], [19]). In addition, we use BAN logic
to formally verify that the smart devices within the HAN
are semantically achieve the security goals.
• Finally, we conduct comparative performance analysis of
the new ASF scheme, showing that the proposed ASF
requires indeed lower computational and communica-
tional costs than [17], [20].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews the related work in smart home use-cases security.
Section III presents the system model, assumptions, and nota-
tions, and Section IV presents the proposed anonymous secure
framework (ASF). Section V introduces security analysis
based on the AVISPA tool, the BAN-logic and informal analy-
sis, and Section VI discusses performance analysis. Finally,
in Section VII we draw the conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
Hoang-Pishva suggested a TOR-based anonymous commu-
nication approach to secure smart home appliances in [12].
Usually the Internet users use TOR as an Internet browser,
which operates as an anonymous browser where only those
surfing activities done within the browser are anonymized, but
authentication is not being performed. Moreover, the scheme
utilizes public-key cryptography, which is quite expensive
for resource hungry devices. Vaidya et al. [17] proposed
a device authentication mechanism for smart energy home
area networks. Based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC),
each device obtains an implicit certificate from the certificate
authority. The mutual authentication is being performed and a
session key is established between two involved entities, where
devices’ identities are being used as a plain-text. Authors
claimed their scheme is efficient compared to other existing
schemes. However, security analysis did not provide details.
Kumar et al [18] introduced lightweight and secure ses-
sion key establishment scheme for smart home environments.
A short authentication token is used to verify the legitimacy of
the smart devices. Authors claimed that the scheme is secure
against various popular attacks, such as denial-of-service and
eavesdropping attacks. However, in [18], the home gateway is
required to store the smart device secret keys in a table and
anonymity and unlinkability are not considered. Santoso and
970 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. 12, NO. 4, APRIL 2017
Vun [20] suggested a strong security in IoT for smart home
systems considering user convenience in operating the system.
The protocol uses ECC due to its high security level per key
size, while the use of pre-shared secret keys (K) removes the
need to establish additional public key infrastructure for the
system. After the authentication process is done, both parties
(i.e., sender and receiver) can use the Elliptic Curve Diffie
Hellman (ECDH) primitive to create a shared key for the
subsequent symmetric encryption.
Ayday and Rajagopal [21] noticed that the existing HAN
technologies, for instance, ZigBee, Z-wave, and INSTEON
support security only up to a certain level. For the smart
grid-enabled HAN, authors introduced three different secure
device authentication mechanisms: (i) authentication mecha-
nism between the gateway and the smart meter; (ii) authen-
tication between the smart appliances and the HAN; and
(iii) authentication between the transient devices and the HAN.
To execute authentication, the schemes are depending on
Internet service provider [21]. Logue et al [22], proposed
a multi-tiered authentication method for facilitating secure
communication amongst smart home devices and cloud-based
server. The scheme exploits the client-server architecture
where the remote server may provide or refuse access to the
client device based on a level of authentication of the client
device. Here, level of authentication means the client device
may authenticate its identity using different device credentials
or other characteristics/relationships. For details, the reader
may refer to [22].
A dynamic and energy aware authentication scheme for
smart home appliances in Internet of Things (DAoT) is
presented in [23]. DAoT focuses on authentication of iden-
tification of Internet of Things (loT) device for accessing
loT network. Authors find key operations for authentication:
key establishment (KE), message authentication code (MAC)
operation and handshake. The KE operation securely derives
confidential keys for cryptographic mechanisms. The MAC
verifies integrity and authentication using the secret keys
and cryptographic mechanisms [23]. However, anonymity and
unlinkability are not the focus of the Kim et al scheme [23].
Premarathne [24] proposed a novel context-aware multi-
attribute continuous authentication model for secure energy
utilization management in smart homes. The scheme uses
location and the critical nature of the tasks as the contextual
information for supporting information allowing the selection
of authentication attributes. The usefulness of the proposed
solution is validated using real-world data sets.
A framework for maintaining security and preserving pri-
vacy for analysis of sensor data from smart homes is proposed
in [25]. The main focus of Chakravorty et al [25] is the
data security instead of the device anonymity. Ryu and Kwak
[26] proposed a secure data access control scheme for smart
homes. The scheme [26] authenticates all devices registered
to a smart home and provides safe access control of the
data while excluded the unlinkability. Moreover, the traditional
authentication protocols [27]–[30] use two/three factor based
authentication. However, the main focuses of the traditional
authentication schemes are the human interventions by means
of the password and/or biometric utilizations. The difference
Fig. 1. System model for Home area network (HAN).
between these [27]–[30] protocols and smart home setting is
that the authentication procedure needs to be automatically
activated by the devices (for instance, the appliances, sensors,
actuators, etc. ), which does not involve any human interaction.
III. SYSTEM MODEL, ATTACK MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we formalize the system model for the smart
home, notations and the assumptions used in the ASF.
A. System Model
A smart home is a tiny intelligent world that provides
services to the inhabitants. Our system model is similar to the
scheme proposed in [18], [20], and [31]. As shown in Fig. 1,
we consider a typical home area network (HAN), which com-
prises of a number of heterogeneous devices (e.g., device A,
device B, and so on) connected to a common gateway.
1) Home Area Network (HAN): This involves mainly three
entities, the device (A), the home gateway (HG), and the
service provider (SP), as follows.
• The device A (smart object and/or smart appliance) is
integrated with the sensor network functionality. The
device A is often restricted in terms of computational
power, bandwidth, and memory, requiring very efficient
operations from the side of the device.
• The home gateway (HG) is connected with a large num-
ber of smart devices, appliances, and with the outer world
via the Internet. The HG, mainly performs two functions:
aggregation and relaying. The aggregation component
is responsible for collecting sensor data and controlling
home devices, while the relaying component helps to
transmit the device data to the individuals, when they are
out of the home. For ease in notation, we here consider
the situation that there is only one HG responsible for
all the devices. Nevertheless, the protocol is described in
such a way that extension is easily possible in the HAN
use-cases since the identity of the HG is involved.
• As in [18], the security service provider (SP) is a trusted
server, and is responsible for generating, distributing the
secret keying material and cyrptosystems to the smart
home devices and the HG.
2) Communication Model: In the HAN, typically, the
smart device communicates to the HG through the HAN
protocol, e.g., ZigBee. Whereas, the HG utilizes mainly
two wireless interfaces: (i) a short-range wireless interface
(e.g., IEEE 802.15.4) maintains the connection with in the
internal (smart) devices, and (ii) a long-range communication
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TABLE I
SYMBOLS AND DESCRIPTIONS
interface (e.g., Wi-Fi/GPRS) maintains a connection with the
outer world via the Internet [18].
3) Attack Model: We consider the Dolev-Yao attack
model [32], where the attacker is able to eavesdrop on the
traffic, inject new messages, replay and change messages, or
spoof other identities. In addition, the attacker may come
from inside or outside the network. However, their goals
might be to obtain illegitimate data access or control to the
smart home devices, to perform service degradation or denial
of service. It must be mentioned that a complete protection
against these types of attacks is inherently very difficult.
A minimal requirement is that detection mechanisms should
be incorporated.
4) Assumptions:
• Consider a typical use-case in a smart home environment,
where a climate sensor needs to provide its sensing
information to the HG on a temporary basis or when
substantial changes are notified.
• The SP and the HG are trusted entities and have no
restrictions with respect to computation power and mem-
ory. In addition, both (the HG and SP) are considered to
be tamper proof.
• The HG and the device A are having identical symmetric
cryptographic systems, which are assumed to be secured
(e.g., encryption, decryption and hash function).
Table I shows the notations and descriptions, which are used
throughout the paper.
IV. ANONYMOUS SECURE FRAMEWORK (ASF)
This section proposes an anonymous secure framework for
connected smart home. Different phases are distinguished:
system setup, installation of devices, and the actual key
establishment phase. We now discuss the construction of each
of them into more detail, as follows.
A. System Setup Phase
This phase invokes offline. Let x and y be two high entropy
secrets chosen by the SP. For a given HG with identity
idG , the SP computes H (x‖y), H (idG‖H (x)). Finally, the SP
stores secret parameters y, idG, H (x‖y), H (idG‖H (x)) to the
memory of the HG.
B. Installation Phase of the Devices
Before deploying a smart device (e.g., Device A) into the
HAN, it (Device A) should be registered and obtained secret
credentials at the SP. In any other case, for a given device A
with identity idA, the SP computes
K = H (y‖H (idG‖H (x))‖α)
Ai = EK (idA‖N)
Bi = H (x‖y) ⊕ Ai
Here, α is an unique authentication token and N denotes the
number of times a device A with identity idA requests an
installation. If this number reaches a threshold, the SP may
decide to refuse an installation. However, the basic idea behind
this construction of the parameters Ai and Bi is that Ai should
be only computable by the legitimate HG. The device A stores
the parameters Bi and H (Ai), which are used during the key
agreement. Given the parameter Bi by the device A, the HG
can derive Ai and thus also a shared value corresponding
to H (Ai). The reason why Ai is constructed by means of
a key K , which compromises of information only known to
one particular HG, is to avoid that this HG would be able to
construct new devices for potentially other HGs in the field.
Finally, in order to conclude the installation phase, the
device stores the values idG, H (x), H (Ai), Bi , α, idA in mem-
ory. The SP also can keep track of the identity of the
device idA, together with the parameters α and N .
C. Key Establishment
The key establishment between the device A and the HG
consists of three steps, containing of two communication
passes and one final computation step. As assumed, the
initiation of the protocol starts from the device A.
1) A → H G : The device A generates a random number
RA and then it computes the following parameters.
V1 = H (idG‖H (x)) ⊕ RA ⊕ T 1
C I Di = Bi ⊕ H (H (idG‖H (x))‖RA‖T 1)
T K = H (Ai) ⊕ RA
C1 = ET K [idA‖idG‖N‖α‖T 1]
Here the device A derives a temporary key (T K =
H (Ai) ⊕ RA). T 1 is the current timestamp of the
device A. Next, A sends V1, C I Di , C1, T 1 to the HG.
2) H G → A : Upon receiving the message, the HG starts
following operations:
(T 2 − T 1) ≤ T ; if not true then abort
RA = V1 ⊕ H (idG‖H (x)) ⊕ T 1
Bi = C I Di
⊕ H (H (idG‖H (x))‖RA‖T 1)
Ai = Bi ⊕ H (x‖y)
T K ∗ = H (Ai) ⊕ RA
DT K ∗ [C1] and obtain id∗A,
id∗G, N∗, α∗, T 1∗
Check if idG == id∗G, T1 == T 1∗
Check id∗A, N∗ by Ai == EK (id∗A‖N∗)
If the checks on id∗A, id∗G , N∗, T 1∗ are positive, the
device A with real identity idA is authenticated and
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Fig. 2. Flow of the proposed ASF.
included in the list of legitimate devices. Otherwise, the
HG aborts the system. Here T 2 is the current timestamp
of the HG and T is a transmission delay, which is
agreed between the device A and HG. Next, the HG
defines the shared symmetric key with the device A as
SK = H (RA‖RHG‖idA‖idG‖α), with RHG a random
value chosen by the HG. In order to let the device A
be able to derive this key, the following parameters are
computed by the HG.
V2 = RHG ⊕ Bi ⊕ H (Ai) ⊕ T 2
C2 = ES K [idG, T 1, T 2]
The HG sends C2, V2, T 2 to the device A.
3) Key establishment: Upon receiving the message, the
device A performs the followings.
(T 3 − T 2) ≤ T ; if not true then abort
RHG = V2 ⊕ Bi ⊕ H (Ai) ⊕ T 2
SK = H (RA‖RHG‖idA‖idG‖α)
DS K [C2] and obtain id∗G, T 1∗, T 2∗
Check if idG == id∗G, T 1 == T 1∗, T 2 == T 2∗
If three conditions are being verified, then the device
A assures that the HG is an authentic gateway and the
computed key SK = H (RA‖RHG‖idA‖idG‖α) can be
used as the shared session key.
4) A ↔ H G : Finally, a confirmed message can eventually
be sent by the device A to the HG.
After the key establishment, the device A shares a dynamic
symmetric session key (SK ) with the HG, which will be used
to securely send its information to the HG. The flow of ASF
is shown in Fig. 2.
With the help of above mentioned procedure, the new
ASF can achieve the anonymity and unlinkability including
authentication and integrity within the smart home network.
The detailed analysis is discussed in Section V.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF ASF
In this section: (a) we simulate the proposed ASF for
formal security verification using the widely-accepted security
Fig. 3. Architecture for AVISPA tool [19], [33].
analyzer tool, i.e., automated verification of Internet security
protocol and application (AVISPA) tool [18], [19], [33]; (b) we
formally analyse, e.g., authentication, session-key establish-
ment and freshness of the proposed ASF using the well-known
BAN-logic [34]; and (c) we informally analyse the security
properties of the proposed ASF.
A. Simulation for Formal Security Verification
of ASF Using AVISPA
AVISPA is a push-button security analyzer tool for the
automated validation of Internet security-sensitive protocols
and applications. The AVISPA tool consists of independently
developed verification backends, as shown in Fig. 3. The
backends are named as on-the fly model-checker (OFMC),
constraint-logic-based attack searcher (CL-AtSe), SAT-based
model-checker (SATMC), and tree automata based on auto-
matic approximations of the analysis of security protocols
(TA4SP). The tool uses a high level protocol specification lan-
guage (HLPSL) for security protocol specification. As shown
in Fig. 3, AVISPA tool takes HLPSL script as an input
and translates to intermediate format (IF) using a HLPSL2IF
translator. The translated IF code is the input for the backends,
and finally the backends generate the output format (OF).
HLPSL is an expressive, modular, formal language that allows
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Fig. 4. Specification of the deviceA role.
for the specification of control flow patterns, data structures,
alternative intruder models, complex security properties, as
well as different cryptographic primitives and their algebraic
properties. These features make HLPSL well suited for spec-
ifying modern, industrial-scale protocols.
Moreover, the HLPSL is a role-based language – it specifies
the roles of each agent in a module that is called a basic role.
The basic role represents what data the agent can use initially,
i.e., parameters, initial state, and ways in which the transition
can happen. The composition role describes an entirely single
session of the protocol by specifying how the legal agents
are communicating to each other over the public channels.
Moreover, a top-level role (i.e., environment role) contains
global constants and a composition of one or more sessions,
where the attacker may play some roles as a legitimate user.
It also describes what knowledge the intruder has about the
networks. In the AVISPA tool, the intruder is modeled through
the channel(dy). The channel(dy) uses the Dolev-Yao attack
model, where an attacker can intercept, analyse, and modify
the messages [32]. For more details refer to [33], and [35].
1) Specifying ASF Scheme: For the validation and testing,
we have implemented the key establishment phase (refer
Section IV.C) using HLPSL script. As we can see from Fig. 2
(i.e., key establishment phase), where the communication is
taking place between the device A and the HG, therefore, there
are two basic roles: deviceA and homeGateway, which are
denoted by the deviceA and HG, respectively. For the deviceA,
the role specifications are shown in Fig. 4 – the deviceA
receives (RCV) a start signal then changes its initial state (i.e.,
0) to 1 and sends <V1, CIDi, C1, T1> using SND() operation
to the HG. In State 3, the deviceA receive a message <
{I Dg.T 1.T 2′}_SK , xor(Rg′, xor(Bi, xor(H ash(Ai, T2′))),
T 2′) > using RCV () operation from the HG. Moreover, in
the declaration part, channel(dy) denotes that the channel is
for the attacker – the attacker/intruder can intercept, analyze,
and modify the messages via channel eavesdropping.
Similarly, the role specifications of the homeGateway are
shown in Fig. 5. The HG receives a message <V1, CIDi,
C1, T1> from the deviceA then changes its initial state
(i.e., 0) to 1 and sends <{I Dg.T 1.T 2′}_SK , xor(Rg′, xor
Fig. 5. Specification of the homeGateway role.
Fig. 6. Specification of the session role.
Fig. 7. Specification of the goal and environment for the proposed ASF.
(Bi, xor(H ash(Ai, T2′))), T 2′) > using SND () operation
to the devieA. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, depict the roles of the
session, and the environment and goals, respectively, of the
proposed ASF. Fig. 6 shows the basic roles of session where
the deviceA and homeGateway are instanced with concrete
arguments, e.g., deviceA(A, H G, SK , H ash, AS, AR) and
homeGateway(A, H G, SK , H ash, H GS, H G R). In Fig. 7,
the top-level role (environment) is always defined that contains
the global constants and the composition of sessions (e.g.,
one or more sessions). In the sessions, the attacker/intruder
may play some roles as legitimate users. In our specification,
the intruder also participates in the execution of protocol
as a concrete session (i.e., intruder_knowledge = {deviceA,
homeGateway, h}), refer Fig. 7. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 7,
the two secrecy goals and four authentications are verified in
the proposed ASF, as follows:
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Fig. 8. ASF results using OFMC backend.
• Secrecy_of sub1, represents that {I Di, I Dg} are kept
secret between the deviceA and HG.
• Secrecy_of sub2, represents that {H ash(x‖y)} are kept
secret between the deviceA and HG.
• Authentication_on deviceA_HG_IDi, states that the
device A identity (i.e, IDi) will be verified at the HG.
• Authentication_on HG_deviceA_IDg, states that the HG
identity (i.e, IDg) will be verified at the device A.
• Authentication_on deviceA_HG_T1, states that the
device A timestamp (i.e, T1) will be verified at the HG.
• Authentication_on HG_deviceA_T2, states that the
HG timestamp (i.e, T2) will be verified at the
device A.
Fig. 8 shows the formal simulation and verification results
of the proposed ASF using OFMC backend. The simula-
tion results ensure that the proposed scheme is safeguard
against the active attacks, for instance, the replay and
man-in-the-middle attacks, and passive attacks. The sum-
mary of the results under OFMC reports that the ASF is
safe.
B. ASF Formal Proof-Using BAN Logic
In this sub-section, we present the formal analysis (e.g.,
authentication, session-key establishment and freshness) of the
proposed ASF using the well-known BAN-logic [34]. For
details, the reader may refer to [34].
1) BAN Logic Notations and Rules: We use directly
BAN-logic symbols and notations from [34] to verify the
proposed framework, as follows.
• X |≡ Y : Let X and Y two principal entities and in
BAN-logic ‘X believes Y ’.
• X  Y : Only ‘X sees Y ’, i.e., assume someone has sent
a message containing Y to X, then X can read and repeat
Y (i.e., after performing some decryption).
• X |∼ Y : The principal ‘X once said Y ’, i.e., at some time
the principal X sent a message including Y.
• X |⇒ Y : The principal ‘X has control over Y ’, the
principal X is an authority on Y and should be trusted
(For instance a server is often assumed to be trusted and
to distribute secret keys efficiently and properly).
• X M⇐⇒ Y : The principal X and Y have message (M) that
contains the secret parameters.
• (Y ): Fresh(Y), which means that Y has not been sent
recently in a message during the protocol execution and
Fresh(Y) protects from replay attack.
• X K←→ Y : The X and Y used a secret key K for securing
the communication. It is assumed that key K will never be
disclosed, except to the designated legitimate principals.
• {M}K : Message M is encrypted using the secret key K .
• 〈M〉N : i.e., M is combined with the secret parameter N
and or with the identity.
Logical Rules The following logical rules will be used to
verify the protocol [34].
1) Message-meaning rule
X |≡ Y K←→ X, X  {M}K
X |≡ Y |∼ M
2) Nonce-verification rule
X |≡  (M), X |≡ Y |∼ M
X |≡ Y |≡ M
3) Control rule
X |≡ Y |⇒ M, X |≡ Y |≡ M
X |≡ M
4) If a principal sees a formula, then it also sees its
components, provided he knows the necessary keys
X  〈M〉N
X  M ,
X  (M, N)
X  M
5) Fresh rule
X |≡  (M)
X |≡  (M, N)
If one part of a formula is fresh, then the entire formula
must also be fresh [34].
2) Formal Verification of the Proposed ASF: We present the
formal verification of the proposed ASF. Using the BAN logic,
our formal analysis mainly focuses on the belief and freshness,
consisting of the following steps: (i) message formalization,
(ii) initial assumptions, (iii) expected goals, and (iv) logic
verification.
a) Message idealization: Message idealization is to spec-
ify the exchanged messages. In the ASF, the idealized mes-
sages among the device A and the HG are obtained as
follows.
M1 : H G  V1 (= H (idG‖H (x)) ⊕ RA ⊕ T 1)
H G  C I Di (= Bi ⊕ H (H (idG‖H (x))‖RA‖T 1)
H G  C1 {idA‖idG‖N‖α‖T 1}T K
H G  T 1
M2 : A  V2 (= RHG ⊕ Bi ⊕ H (Ai) ⊕ T 2)
A  C2 (= {idG, T 1, T 2}S K )
A  T 2
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b) Assumptions: In ASF, a principal believes that (a) it
has shared secrets and keys with the assigned principals,
(b) the random numbers and timestamps are fresh, and
(c) a legitimate principal has control over the entitled com-
ponents and values. The intuitive assumptions are as follows:
• For the HG:
A1: H G |≡ A V1,C I Di ,C1,T 1⇐⇒ H G
A2: H G |≡ A S K←→ H G
A3: H G |≡ (A |⇒ A S K←→ H G)
A4: H G |≡  (RHG)
A5: H G |≡  (T 2)
A6: H G |≡ (A |⇒ idA)
• For the device A:
A7: A |≡ H G C2,V2,T 2⇐⇒ A
A8: A |≡ H G K←→ A
A9: A |≡ H G S K←→ A
A10: A |≡ (H G ⇒ H G S K←→ A)
A11: A |≡  (RA)
A12: A |≡  (T 1)
c) Expected goals: The expected security goals refer to
belief and freshness of the exchanged messages, which are
transmitted between the legitimate entities and agreed on a
session key (SK). Moreover, the messages are never used in
former sessions. In ASF, the expected goals are the following.
G1: H G |≡ A K←→ H G i.e., shared secret key (K)
G2: A |≡ H G |≡ A S K←→ H G i.e., session key (SK)
G3: H G |≡ A |≡ H G S K←→ A i.e., session key (SK)
G4: H G |≡  (RA, T 1) i.e., freshness
G5: A |≡  (RHG , T 2) i.e., freshness
d) Logic verification: Based on the message idealization,
and initial assumptions, and BAN-logic rules, we perform the
logic verification (i.e., expected goals).
Goal 1: H G |≡ A K←→ H G
Proof: According to A1: H G |≡ A C1,V1,C I Di ,T 1⇐⇒ H G,
it turns out that the HG believes the device A, which wants
to start a session.
Now, according to M1: H G  V1, H G  C I Di ,
H G  C1, H G  T 1, it turns out that the HG sees 〈V1〉R A,
〈C I Di 〉Bi , therefore, H G  T K ( = H (Ai) ⊕ RA), and
{C1}T K , by applying rule 4. Due to idG == id∗G, T1 == T 1∗,
we obtain that
H G  {C1}T K , 〈C I Di 〉Bi , 〈V1, C I Di 〉R A
Next, applying message-meaning rule and A6, and the follow-
ing is obtained
H G |≡ A | ∼ 〈C I Di 〉Bi
H G |≡ A | ∼ 〈C1, C I Di 〉id A,R A
H G |≡ A | ∼ 〈V1〉R A
Note that, Bi contains H (x‖y) ⊕ Ai and here Ai (=
EK (idA‖N)) is computed using a shared key K , refer instal-
lation phase of the devices (Section IV.B). It turns out that
H G  Ai ( = {idA‖N}K )
Therefore,
H G |≡ A K←→ H G
If HG believes that key K is a shared secret with device
A and then the HG will believe that the device A once sent
the message (i.e., C1, V1, C I Di , T 1). Moreover, if the HG
believes that idA == id∗A and N == N∗ then the device A
is the legitimate and authenticated entity. 
Goal 2: A |≡ H G |≡ A S K←→ H G
Proof: According to A7: A |≡ H G C2,V2,T 2⇐⇒ A, it
turns out that the device A believes the HG and the message
C2, V2, T 2 contains the secret parameters, which will be used
to derive the session key (SK ).
Considering M2: A  C2, A  V2 and A  T 2, it turns
out that the device A receives (RHG ⊕ Bi ⊕ H (Ai) ⊕ T 2),
{idG, T 1, T 2}S K , and T 2. Due to id∗G = idG , we obtain that
A  〈V2〉R HG
A   (T 2)
By applying message-meaning rule and A12, we obtain
A |≡ H G | ∼ 〈V2〉RH G
A |≡ H G | ∼ 〈SK 〉R A, R HG, id A, idG ,α
A |≡ H G | ∼  (T 2)
If the device A believes the HG and so the RHG and T 2
then it also believes in the session key (SK ). By applying A9
and A10, we obtain
A |≡ H G | ≡ A S K (=H(RA‖RH G‖idA‖idG‖α))←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ H G
A | ≡ (H G ⇒ H G S K←→ A)
Thus, G2 has proven, and similarly, G3 can be proved. 
Goal 4: H G |≡  (RA, T 1)
Proof: From M1: H G  V1, in which V1 contains
H (idG‖H (x)) ⊕ RA ⊕ T 1, here RA is a random number and
HG will compute RA = V1 ⊕ H (idG‖H (x)) ⊕ T 1. Now,
applying rule 5 (fresh rule) and A11, we obtain that,
H G |≡  (RA)
Next applying to M1: H G  T 1, here T 1 is the current
timestamp of device A. Applying rule 5 and A12, we obtain,
H G |≡  (T 1)
Hence the goal G4 (H G |≡  (RA, T 1)) has been achieved,
i.e., the HG believes that RA and T 1 are fresh. Similarly,
the goal G5 can be proved, i.e., A |≡ (RHG , T 2). 
C. Informal (Security) Analysis
This sub-section discusses the security properties of the ASF
along with the prevention against possible security attacks.
Recall the attack model from Section III.B, where an adversary
is able to eavesdrop on the traffic, inject new messages, replay
and change messages, or spoof identities.
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1) Anonymity and Unlinkability: Assume that an adver-
sary (J) eavesdrops on the wireless traffic between the device
A and the HG and tries to spoof the device’s identity idA.
However, in the proposed ASF, when the device A wants to
connect to the HG, it does not send idA in the plain-text but
a temporary C I Di (= Bi ⊕ H (H (idG‖H (x))‖RA‖T 1)) alias
instead. Only the legitimate HG can deduce the real identity
of the device A by decrypting C1 = ET K [idA‖idG‖N‖T 1],
Ai = EK (idA‖N). The proposed framework therefore
achieves identity anonymity between the device A and the HG.
Similarly, the proposed ASF achieves unlinkability. Assum-
ing that the adversary tries to trace whether a legal device
A has previously requested to connect the HG, the attacker
will not be able to link this attempt successfully in the ASF.
For instance, for each session, the device A computes the
authentic message (C1, V1, C I Di , T 1) in step 1, cf. Fig. 2.
All these messages are always different, since the message
(C1, V1, C I Di , T 1) is randomized by the random number
RA and/or it contains the current timestamp (T 1) of the
device A. It is difficult to link two different value instances
(C1, V1, C I Di , T 1). Likewise, the same holds for step 2, cf.
Fig. 2. The ASF therefore achieves unlinkability.
However, it should be noted that unlinkability does hold for
the malicious devices connected to the same HG. Assuming
that a malicious device may retrieve (somehow) Bi from
C I Di as it is aware of H (idG‖H (x)). However, from Bi(=
H (x‖y)⊕ Ai), it is still not possible to derive the correspond-
ing device A’s identity because (Ai ) is encrypted with key
K (= H (y‖H (idG‖H (x))‖α)), refer Section IV-B.
2) Mutual Authentication and Integrity: Mutual authentica-
tion is an important property for a verification service resisting
to unauthorized access. The proposed ASF provides a mutual
authentication for the communicating entities. The HG can
authenticate the device A by means of id∗A, N∗ from Ai ==
EK (id∗A‖N∗), refer step 2 in Fig. 2. Similarly, the device A
can authenticate the HG using idG == id∗G .
In addition, message integrity is realized by one-way hash
functions. The device A messages (C I Di ) are computed and
transmitted in terms of H (·) for identifying declaration and
verification of the ASF messages.
3) Resistance to Replay Attack: In these attacks, an adver-
sary (J) wants to replay the previous messages, which are
being eavesdropped from the communication entities, e.g., the
device A and the HG. Assuming that an attacker intercepts
valid message (C1, V1, C I Di , T 1) and tries to start a session
with the HG by replaying the same intercepted message. The
message verification at the HG will fail due to the interval
(T 2−T 1) ≤ T , here T 2 is HG’s system time while receiving
the replayed message. Similarly, the same holds when an
attacker (J) intercepts a valid message (C2, V2, T 2) and tries
to connect to the device A by replaying the same intercepted
message. The message verification at the device A will fail
because of the interval (T 3 − T 2) ≤ T , here T 3 is the
device A’s system time while receiving the replayed message.
Thus, the proposed ASF resistant to replay attacks.
4) Protection Against Impersonation Attack:
An attacker (J), willing to impersonate the device A, may try
to forge the message (C1, V1, C I Di , T 1) in step 1 in Fig. 2.
However, J can not know the device’s real
identity, i.e., idA, which is confidential (ET K [idA‖
idG‖N‖T 1] and EK (idA‖N)) under the temporary key
(T K = H (Ai) ⊕ RA) and secret key K (= H (y‖H (idG‖
H (x))‖α)), respectively. Since the key K (=
H (y‖H (idG‖H (x))‖α)) is computed using the unique
authentication token (α), the attacker cannot impersonate the
device A by forging a correct message.
Similarly, to impersonate the HG, an attacker must know the
secret token (α) to generate the legal message (C2), which
is encrypted with SK = H (RA‖RHG‖idA‖idG‖α). Since,
J does not possess secrets (α), he/she cannot impersonate the
legitimate HG.
5) Resistance Against Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack:
We here assume that an attacker (J) may try a MIMT attack
by modifying (C1, V1, C I Di , T 1) to (C1J , V1J , C I Di J , T 1).
The HG however will detect this attempt when the parameters
of Ai are decrypted using K = H (y‖H (idG‖H (x))‖α) and
will verify idA. If this does not hold, the HG aborts the system.
Moreover, as J does not know the key K , he/she therefore
cannot compute the real Ai = EK (idA‖N)). Thus MITM
attack is difficult to the proposed ASF.
6) Secure Session Key Agreement With Forward Secrecy:
It can be seen in the proposed ASF, after performing the
mutual authentication between the device A and the HG,
the session key (SK = H (RA‖RHG‖idA‖idG‖α)) is being
generated using pseudo-random numbers and timestamps to
provide session freshness and randomization. The transmitted
messages are typically computed using the random numbers
(RA, and RHG ), which make that the exchanged messages can
be regarded as dynamic variables. Moreover, compromising
long-term key K does not compromise past sessions because
the adversary has no way to obtain the random numbers
(RA, and RHG ), which are protected in V1 = H (idG‖H (x))⊕
RA ⊕ T 1, C I Di = Bi ⊕ H (H (idG‖H (x))‖RA‖T 1), and
V2 = RHG⊕ Bi ⊕ H (Ai) ⊕ T 2. Therefore, the ASF provides
perfect forward secrecy and an adversary will find difficulties
to correlate the ongoing session with the previous sessions.
7) Secure Against Smart Device Compromised Threat:
Assume that an attacker compromises the smart device (e.g.,
device A) and tries to get secret information from the device.
It is widely accepted that physical attacks are difficult to
prevent if the devices are not tamper-proof [36]. Nevertheless,
similar to [18], the proposed ASF relies on the deviceA-to-HG
communication architecture, where each smart device stores
a unique authentication token (α), which is shared with the
HG only. Therefore, no communication is being taking place
between two distinct smart devices [18], which means the
proposed scheme can increase the network resilience against a
node (e.g., device A) compromised threat. Furthermore, in the
smart home settings, the smart devices are physically secured
since they are deployed mostly inside the home where the
HG can check at regular interval whether a smart device is
misbehaving using the scheme proposed in [37].
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of the proposed
ASF in terms of computational and communicational costs.
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Fig. 9. Beacon frame format [18].
TABLE II
MEMORY CONSUMPTION AND EXECUTION TIME
A. Experiment Setup
In order to implement the ASF on the low-powered device
(i.e., device A), we choose TelosB mote, same as in [18].
TelosB mote [38] runs TinyOS version 2.x [39]. We recom-
mend the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) symmetric-
key algorithm for the encryption. AES is the current encryption
standard and it is integrated in CC2420 radios [40]. For the
sake of experiment purposes, we chosen SHA1 [41] for the
hashing operations. Similar to [18], the HG is considered to
be the clock manager for the smart home and synchronizes
the clocks of the smart devices. To do this, the HG sends
a time beacon frame (which includes clock frequency and
synchronization information, as shown in Fig. 9 [18]) to the
home devices. Interested readers may follow [18] for the
detailed experimental setup. Moreover in our experimental
setup, we consider a typical use-case for the smart home
environment, where a sensor needs to provide its sensing
information to the HG on a temporary basis.
B. Computational Cost
Before starting the investigation, note that we consider
the communication cost only for the device A, since it
is a resource-hungry device. To analyze the computational
price (in terms of memory consumption and execution
time), we consider only the key establishment phase (refer
Section IV-C). As we can see from Fig. 2, the proposed
framework is mainly based on the hash function, encryption,
decryption, and XOR operation. Table II shows that the
ASF requires reasonable memory size and execution time
for the TelosB mote. Bitwise Exclusive-OR operations use
only bits shifting, and thus have negligible memory footprints.
Furthermore, Table III shows computational cost comparisons
of the proposed ASF with [17], [18] and [20] schemes. It
can be seen from Table III, the proposed ASF requires 2H
+ 1E +1D + 3XOR operations, which are lightweight in
terms of execution time for such resource-hungry smart home
devices. Whereas, the public key cryptography operations,
like the signature generation and the point multiplication
are quite expensive in terms of time complexity [42]. The
schemes proposed in [17] and [20] take 2t + 4H + 1Sig
and 2t + 1H + 1Sig, respectively, therefore, both schemes
are expensive for the low-cost smart devices (e.g., TelosB).
Kumar et al scheme [18] requires 2H + 1MAC + 1HMAC +
1E + 1D operations, which is also well suited to the home
TABLE III
COMPUTATION COST COMPARISONS AT RESOURCE-HUNGRY DEVICE
TABLE IV
TOTAL EXECUTION TIME (IN SECONDS)
environments. In addition, Table IV briefly compares the
time complexity of our framework with the existing schemes.
The actual time complexity depends upon the time taken
to execute each operation at the low-powered device (e.g.,
TelosB) by each protocol. Considering [42] implementations,
Vaidya et al [17] scheme incurs ≈ 10.336 seconds, and
Santoso-Vun’s scheme requires ≈ 10 seconds. Kumar et al’s
scheme incurs ≈ 0.17 seconds to execute the whole protocol
at the device A. Whereas the ASF requires ≈ 0.123 seconds.
Due to the fact of public key cryptography, [17] and [20] are
quite expensive, while on the contrary [18] and the proposed
ASF requires significantly low computation cost.
However, it is important to note that all the previous proto-
cols have different security services from the proposed ASF.
For instance, the protocols proposed in [17], [18], and [20] are
mainly providing authentication and session key establishment
between the communicating entities, whereas the new ASF is
also providing anonymity and unlinkability including authen-
tication and key establishment properties to preserve the smart
home devices security and privacy.
C. Communicational Cost
To investigate the communicational overhead of the ASF, we
consider the total number of bits transmitted and received by
the device A to start the boot-strapping. Total communication
cost of the proposed ASF is as follows. Kumar et al. [18]
suggested the following message sizes for the smart home
environment, device A ID as 1 byte, random number as
4 bytes, timestamp as 4 bytes, and 16 bytes key size, and
16 bytes for a hash function. Consider similar packet sizes,
the first message sends 232 bits to the HG (i.e., A → H G)
in ASF, and receives 72 bits of message (i.e., H G → A)
from the HG. Resultant, the communication overhead for the
proposed framework is 304 bits (i.e., 232 + 72). Considering
similar home environment, a smart home device transmits one
message (256 bits), and receive two messages (268 bits) in
Kumar et al scheme [18]. We did not consider the com-
munication costs (in bits) for the Vaidya et al and Santoso
and Vun schemes, since the authors did not implement their
schemes. Table V summarizes the communication overhead
for the proposed ASF and [18].
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TABLE V
COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
Fig. 10. Communication cost comparisons.
Moreover, for the sake of comparison purposes, Fig. 10
shows the communication costs comparisons (in terms of the
number of message exchanges) of the proposed scheme and
[17], [18], and [20]. As we can see from Fig. 10, to execute the
whole protocol, Vadiya et al scheme [17] takes two rounds of
message exchanges, Santoso-Vun’s and Kumar et al schemes
need three message exchanges. Whereas, the proposed ASF
requires two rounds of message exchanges. It indicates that
ASF’s computation and communication costs are reasonable.
VII. CONCLUSION
Connected smart home environments offer enriched services
and information for individuals. Such homes are heteroge-
neous and dynamic: they contain smart devices to enable
individuals to enjoy network based services, such as climate
control, energy management, home healthcare, and so on.
However, device anonymity and unlinkability are actual chal-
lenges, where an unauthorized entity can identify the home
devices (e.g., appliances, etc.) identities, sensors presence, and
data-collection activities by network tracking.
This paper therefore defined a set of desirable properties
for securing the smart home environments and presented
an anonymous secure framework (ASF) for the connected
smart homes. The proposed framework realized anonymity and
unlinkability, authentication and integrity, established mutual
trust relationships via the lightweight operations, and achieved
session freshness dynamically. It indicated that the ASF is
suitable for the next-generation smart home environments.
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